Domestic Relations--Right of Surviving Parent to Custody of Child by Ferguson, Jo M.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 27 | Issue 4 Article 13
1939




Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Family Law Commons
Click here to let us know how access to this document benefits you.
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation




DOMESTIC RELATIONS-RIGHT OF SURVIVING, PARENT TO
CUSTODY OF CHILD
A father, upon the death of his wife, gave his child into the keep-
ing of its maternal grandmother. For more than six years thereafter,
the father had no regular employment, but a few months before bring-
ing this suit, he obtained such employment and married a woman of
exemplary character. He now seeks the custody of the child. Both the
father and the grandmother are persons of good character and very
moderate means. The child, a boy now twelve years old, expressed a
strong desire to remain with his grandmother. The chancellor, finding
that a contract had been entered into at the time the father surrendered
the custody of the child, and also that the welfare of the child would
be better served by leaving him in his present home, decreed in favor
of the grandmother. Held, airmed. The serious injury which would
result to the child from a severance of the ties which now bind him,
coupled with his own desire, is decisive. The controlling consideration
is the welfare of the child. Bridges v. Matthews, 276 Ky. 59, 122 S. W.
(2d) 1021 (1938).
It has ordinarily been held that a parent who is a suitable person
to have the custody of the child and is able to provide for it, is entitled
to the custody as against other persons.' This rule has been applied
although such others were much attached to the child,2 and it was
attached to them,' and preferred to remain with them,4 and they were
suitable to have its custody.r But American. courts, which have always
regarded the welfare of the child as the controlling circumstance in
according custody as between the parents," have frequently adopted the
welfare test even in contests between a parent and a third person.7
'Aired v. Alred, 161 Ga. 687, 132 S. E. 208 (1926); Hohenadel v.
Steele, 237 Ill. 229, 86 N. E. 717 (1908); Matter of Livingston, 151 App.
Div. 1, 135 N. Y. S. 328 (1912); Atkinson v. Downing, 175 N. 0. 244,
95 S. E. 487 (1918).
2 Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, 111 Pac. 21 (1910); Van Auken v.
Wieman, 128 Iowa 476, 104 N. W. 464 (1905); Nickle v. Burnett, 122
Miss. 56, 84 So. 138 (1920); Hedtke v. Kukuk, 92 Okla. 264, 220 Pac. 615
(1923).
3 3Ex parte Mathews, 176 Cal. 156, 167 Pac. 873 (1917); State ex rel.
Kearney v. Steele, 121 La. 215, 46 So. 215 (1908); State v. Ellison, 271
Mo. 416, 196 S. W. 1140 (1917).
' State ex rel. Martin, 161 La. 192, 108 So. 411 (1926); Kinnaird v.
Lowry, 102 Miss. 557, 59 So. 843 (1912).
rPowell v. Johnson, 213 Ala. 259, 104 So. 525 (1925); Wood v.
Lee, 123 Kan. 669, 256 Pac. 797 (1927); State v. Deaton, 93 Tex. 243,
54 S. W. 901 (1900).
, Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations (1931) p. 371.
1 U. S. ex rel. Schneider v. Savage, 91 Fed. 490 (Circuit Ct. W. D.
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Somewhate different rules may apply where the parent has given
the custody of the child to another by contract. There is a conflict of
opinion as to the validity of a contract or agreement by which the
parent surrenders the legal right to the custody and control of his
child. Many American decisions have held such a contract valid if
properly executed.8 Other courts, however, insist that this agreement
Is invalid as against public policy, since a child is not property or the
subject of a conveyance.' But it appears that even in jurisdictions hold-
ing the contract invalid, the parent will not regain custody unless it is
for the best interests of the child.10
It is impossible to define with certainty the ground upon which the
decision In the principal case was placed. The chancellor found that
a contract had been made, and the decision states that the court was
"not disposed to disturb the chancellor's finding in that respect".n
Immediately thereafter the court "concedes for present purposes" that
a contract was made, and never thereafter discusses the question. The
remainder of the decision might be interpreted to mean that the ques-
tion of existence or non-existence of the contract is not controlling.
One of the two cases cited in the opinion as precendents for allowing
the grandmother to retain custody is a non-contract case." If it was
the intention of the court to base its decision solely upon its opinion
of the welfare of the child, the case is clearly contrary to the more
carefully considered decisions in this jurisdiction.
The statutes expressly provide that "in the event of the death of
either one of the parents, . . . the survivor, if suited to the trust, shall
have the custody, nurture and education of such infant child."'
Pa. 1899); Miller v. Banks, 280 S. W. 301 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); 46
C. J. 1240.
" Miller v. Miller et ux., 123 Iowa 165, 98 N. W. 631 (1904); Enders
v. Enders et al., 164 Pa. 266, 30 Atl. 129 (1894).
'Harper v. Tipple, 21 Ariz. 41, 184 Pac. 1005 (1919); Clark '.
White, 102 Ark. 93, 143 S. W. 587 (1912); Dunham v. Dunham, 97 Conn.
440, 117 Atl. 504 (1922); Hooks et al. v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122,
229 S. W. 1114 (1921).
"Stringfellow v. Somerville, 95 Va. 701, 29 S. E. 685 (1898);
Odlasek v. Odlasek, 98 W. Va. 357, 127 S. E. 59 (1925).
n Bridges v. Matthews, 276 Ky. 59, 62, 122 S. W. (2d) 1021, 1023
(1938).
"Cummins v. Bird, 230 Ky. 296, 19 S. W. (2d) 959 (1929). (But
probably the real basis for this decision was that the parent was unsuit-
able; If so, it is not authority for the principal case.)
"Kentucky Statutes (Carroll's, 1936) See. 2016 (enacted 1892,
amended 1910). [Statutes in other jurisdictions provide for surviving
parent's right to custody under various conditions: "If parent fit
person," Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), Ch. 64, See. 4; Gen. Laws Mass. (1932),
Ch. 201, Sec. 5; "suitable", Burns Ind. Stats. Ann. (1933) 8-109; Com-
piled Laws Michigan (1929) Sec. 15768; except where unsuitable or
child's interest would be adversely affected, Revised Code Delaware
(1935) Sec. 3576; absence of misconduct, Oregon Code Ann. (1930)
33-304. No conditions stated: Idaho Code Ann. (1932) 31-1007; Code
of Iowa (1931) Secs. 12573-12574; Rev. Stats. Maine (1930) Ch. 72,
Sees. 43 and 45; Rev. Stats. Missouri (1929) See. 375; Vernon's Texas
Stats. (1936) Art. 4118.]
K. L. J.-8
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Despite language in a few decisions to the contrary,4 it is undoubtedly
the law in Kentucky, in cases not involving custodial contracts, that
a surviving parent is entitled to the custody of a child if he Is suited
to the trust, and the court will not impose its own opinion as to what
is best for the child.5 In the clearest statement of Kentucky's position
on the subject, Judge Logan, speaking for the court, prefers to state
the proposition thus:
"It is true that many of the opinions deal with the question of
what is best for the child, but the statute makes it conclusive that
it is best for the child to be with the surviving parent if the sur-
viving parent is suited to the trust."'61
This rule in favor of the parent is none the less applicable where
the person contesting the parent's right is a grandparent, who has a
right superior to that of an entire stranger."T Nor is the parent's right
defeated by the desire of the child to remain with the grandparent.
The court is not entirely without precedent's for its statement in the
principal case that the desire of the child should be given great weight,
but the better authority in Kentucky is for the view that the child's
wishes are to be considered only in close cases.'
The parent has no such superior right when he has agreed to give
14 Before statute: Ellis v. Jesup and wife, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 403
(1875); Burke v. Crutcher, 11 Ky. Op. 695, 697 (1882); Smith v.
Martin, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 754 (1883, Superior Court). Under statute:
Cummins v. Bird, 230 Ky. 296, 19 S. W. (2d) 959 (1929). (But this
case may perhaps be explained on the ground a fatier is unsuitable
for the custody of a girl approaching adolescence, even though he Is
of good character and is financially secure.)
2Mason v. Williams, et al., 165 Ky. 331, 176 S. W. 1171 (1915);
Rallihan v. Motschmann, 179 Ky. 180, 200 S. W. 358 (1918); Walker v.
Crockett, 194 Ky. 531, 240 S. W. 35 (1922); Hampton v. Alcorn et al.,
213 Ky. 599, 281 S. W. 540 (1926); Moore et ux. v. Smith, 228 Ky. 286,
14 S. W. (2d) 1072, 1074 (1929) (".... the only question for considera-
tion is whether appellee [the surviving parent] . . . is 'suited to the
trust'."); Baker et al. v. Coleman et al., 229 Ky. 473, 17 S. W. (2d)
417 (1929); Matlock v. Elam et ux., 262 Ky. 631, 90 S. W. (2d) 1016
(1936); Johnson v. Cook, 274 Ky. 841, 120 S. W. (2d) 675 (1938).16 Thompson v. Childers et al., 231 Ky. 179, 181, 21 S. W. (2d) 247,
248 (1929).
17 Johnson v. Cook, 274 Ky. 841, 120 S. W. (2d) 675 (1938).
"sEllis v. Jesup and wife, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 403 (1875).
1Stapleton v. Poynter, 111 Ky. 264, 62 S. W. 730 (1901); Rallihan v.
Motschmann, 179 Ky. 180, 200 S. W. 358 (1918); Johnson v. Cook, 274
Ky. 841, 849, 120 S. W. (2d) 675, 679 (1938). (Rafihan case, Ky. p. 191,
S. W. p. 363: ". . . it is only where the court is in great doubt ... that
the preference of the child is given weight ... where there is no doubt
of the proper judgment, there is no necessity to rest the decision upon
the immature judgment of an infant of tender years, who is in the
custody of some of the parties and speaks alone from its present affec-
tions.") (Other jurisdictions: In a contest between a parent and third
person, mere preference of child will not as a rule be allowed to prevail,
though it may be considered on question of welfare. State v. Cline,
91 Fla. 300, 107 So. 446 (1926); Kinnaird v. Lowry, 102 Miss. 557,
59 So. 843 (1912).
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the custody of the child to another. Kentucky recognizes such con-
tracts as valid and binding upon the parent.20
"If a father desires to make a contract whereby . . . he may
be relieved, at least in part, of the burden of [the children's] sup-
port, there Is no good reason why the contract should not be
enforced. . . good conscience demands that [the father] be
estopped from repudiating his agreement to the distress of those
having the custody of the children, and the children themselves."M
It is only in these cases of custodial agreements that the rule
should prevail that the welfare of the child is the controlling con-
sideration. For in these cases, though the court may enforce the con-
tract even against a parent who is "suitable", it will be disregarded
and custody restored to the parent where the welfare of the infant
dictates that such be done.2 It is this "welfare of the child" rule in
favor of the parent in "contract" cases, which the courts have some-
times erroneously attempted to apply against the parent in "non-con-
tract" cases. Where no custodial contract is involved the only test is
the "suitability" rule to be applied to the parent seeking custody.
Such phrases as "suitability of parent" and "welfare of the child" are
not subject to exact definition, and the court has made no attempt to
so define them, but they may be distinguished. The suitability rule
looks to the parent, and to him alone. If he is a person of moral
habits, free from infectious or contagious disease, and of enough
industry to reasonably insure the child from want and positive distress,
he Is "suitable". The welfare rule looks primarily to the child, but
also to the parent, and to the person seeking to retain custody. It
enables the court to weigh the psychological and economic factors.
The materiality of the distinction between the "suitability" rule in
non-contract cases and the "welfare" rule in contract cases in clearly
revealed by the facts of the principal case. If there was no contract the
father, who was admittedly "suitable" to have custody of the child,
should have prevailed; if there was a contract, the court's action in
allowing the grandmother to retain custody was correct, since the
father did not show that a change would benefit the child. It is clear
that there was a contract; the decision is unfortunate only in that it
falls to indicate a recognition that this was the basis on which the
discussion of the welfare of the child must rest.
These cases, involving as they do the delicate question of parental
rights, should not be lightly decided according to what the court may
1 Proctor v. Rhoads, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 453 (Superior Court, 1882);
Bedford v. Hamilton, 153 Ky. 429, 155 S. W. 1128 (1913) (Orphanage
held best for child although one adoptive and one natural parent
living); Thompson v. Childers et al., 231 Ky. 179, 21 S. W. (2d) 247
(1929); Contra dictum: Mason v. Williams et al., 165 Ky. 331, 334,
176 S. W. 1171, 1172 (1915).
11 Thompson v. Childers et al., 231 Ky. 179, 134, 21 S. W. (2d) 247,
250 (1929).
2Bedford v. Hamilton, 153 Ky. 429, 155 S. W. 1128 (1913); Scott
et al. v. Kirkpatrick, 205 Ky. 700, 266 S. W. 390 (1924).
2" Stapleton v. Poynter, 111 Ky. 264, 268, 62 S. W, 730, 731 (1901).
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happen to think is the best interest of the child. It is socially danger-
ous to deny the custody of a child to a parent who is suited to the
trust, and precedent will not justify the action of a court which so
interferes with natural relationships, unless the parent has voluntarily
and expressly parted with his rights, and cannot be heard to complain.
"It is one of the cardinal principles of nature and of law that
... the father ... if able to support the child in his own style of
life, and of good moral character, cannot, without the most shock-
ing injustice, be deprived of the privilege by anyone whatever...
It is not enough to consider the interest of the child alone."-"
The above quotation, substituting only the word "parent" for
"father", expresses the law in Kentucky as defined by the better rea-
soned cases and by statute. It is earnestly submitted that the distinc-
tion between "contract" and "non-contract" cases should be rigidly
maintained, and the rule that the welfare of the infant is the controlling
consideration should be applied only in those cases in which the parent
has contracted away his rights, and is seeking to regain custody of
his child despite the contract. Jo MV. FERGusoN
TAXATION-INHERITANCE TAX-INTEREST IN JOINT TENANCY
PASSING BY SURVIVORSHIP
Plaintiff and decedent held certain stocks, bonds, and real estate
in joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Plaintiff paid under protest
an inheritance tax on one-half of the joint estate and now seeks to have
the State Auditor issue a warrant to him for the amount so paid. Held:
The tax was valid. Thus, the statute" providing that the property held
by joint tenants and payable to the survivor upon the death of one
should be deemed a transfer of one half in the same manner as tho
held by them as tenants in common and bequeathed or devised to the
surviving tenant by the deceased tenant by will was held constitutional.
DuBois Admr. v. Shannon, 275 Ky. 516, 122 S. W. (2d) 103 (1938).
The principal contention of the plaintiff was that the law only
covered transfers by devise and intestate succession, and, since this
was a transfer by survivorship, it did not come within the statute.2
But the inheritance tax law expressly covers the situation presented
in this case.2 Even if it did not, the transfer of an interest in a joint
estate might be taxable as a "deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift. . ..
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death
of the grantor or donor". The court did not mention this section,
but it seems that it could have been cited to meet plaintiff's contention.
2' Verser v. Ford et al., 37 Ark. 27, 29 (1881).
1 Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1930 Edition, Sec. 4281a-1, subd. 4.
Same section in 1936 edition, 4281a-15.
2275 Ky. 516, 518, 122 S. W. (2d) 103, 104 (1938).
2 Supra note 1.
' Kentucky Statutes, 1930 Edition, Sec. 4281a-1, subd. 1.
